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News articles, which pop up pretending to bear valuable information for investors, cause 
significant changes in stock prices. But occasionally that information turns out to be false. 
According to Eugene Fama (1965) and his Efficient Market Hypothesis financial markets are 
efficient if and when new information about the firm fundamentals is instantaneously 
incorporated in its stock price. In theory, the recall of false news should lead to a reverse of 
prices to pre-event levels. In reality, the idea of efficient markets faces many challenges. It will 
be shown that, besides other market anomalies, public attention induces a persistent rise (fall) 
in share prices, even though clarifying information has already been published. 
Keywords: Efficient Markets, Efficient Market Hypothesis, False News Shocks, Investor 
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A continuous discussion is carried on by economists related towards the efficiency of 
financial markets. Such markets are considered efficient if and when new information about 
the fundamental value of an asset is instantaneously incorporated in its stock price (Fama, 
1965). Nevertheless, financial markets are confronted with noise that affects the processing of 
informative news and investor behavior towards trading activities. Hence, the idea of efficient 
financial markets faces many challenges.        
 Nowadays, new technologies are emerging with increasing frequencies, which have 
media become more accessible for investors regardless of place and time. The research 
question of this paper is:        
 Does the almost unlimited access to media and therefore information result in an 
improvement of market efficiency?        
 The difficulty will consist in measuring the level of efficiency. False news shocks can 
be seen as an experiment to further examine the reactions towards an unexpected presence of 
new information. It will be of particular interest for this work to examine shocks proven as 
wrong in order to investigate the context of market efficiency. In theory, rational investors do 
not only trade on the immediate appearance of the false news, but also right after the 
announcement of the resolving argument. The pace of the reverse price adjustment will be used 
as an indicator for the market efficiency.      
 Firstly, this paper will concentrate on the theoretical background regarding the topic. 
Eugene Fama describes in his Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) how rational market 
participants react towards new information. It will be seen that market efficiency is strained by 
immediate price movements. In theory, the recall of false news should lead to a reverse of 
prices to pre-event levels. Furthermore, several anomalies challenge the EMH. Certain 
behavioral biases and investment patterns run counter to EMH and generate abnormal returns. 
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Afterwards, the focus will be turned towards the role of the media in financial markets and 
investor behavior. Therefore, Tetlock’s (2007) studies of stock market news respecting investor 
psychology will be discussed as well as Peress’s (2014) outcomes about the diffusion of 
information in financial markets. It will be proven that high pessimism triggers downward 
pressure on asset prices and media thus do not clearly act as noise. Furthermore, the casual 
impact of media in financial markets will be demonstrated by the studies of Fang and Peress 
(2009).            
 The theoretical analysis will be substantiated by an empirical study of false news 
shocks.  An event study approach is performed to assess the time it takes the market to reverse 
the impact of fake news. The general idea of this measure is to differentiate between the returns 
that would have been expected if the news shock would not have taken place. Abnormal returns 
are used to isolate the effect of the event from other general market movements.   
 The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief description 
about the theory and background of several streams of research. Section 3 describes the 
methodology and data. Section 4 presents the results of the paper. Section 5 provides an 
analysis of possible interpretations for the observed findings. The last section concludes.  
2 Theory and Background 
2.1 The Efficient Market Hypothesis and its challenges  
 
In 1970, Eugene Fama developed the EMH. In his studies, he describes that financial 
markets are efficient if all existing and available information is fully reflected in the price of 
an asset. Therefore, no market participant is able to purchase (sell) undervalued (overvalued) 
securities and hence cannot generate excess returns in the long-run.   
 Consistent with EMH, is the theory of random walks in stock market prices. As soon 
as new relevant information appears, it should be instantaneously incorporated in prices (Fama, 
1965). Therefore, future price changes will be independent from historical price changes. In an 
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efficient market, prices reflect the judgements of all investors and analysts at any point of time, 
consequently, there is no need to believe in the chance of finding mispriced assets.  
 Fama’s (1965) assumption for the EMH mainly derives from a concept of constant 
competition between rational and profit-maximizing investors. Investors have the desire to gain 
from predicting future values by analyzing currently released information. In fact, the higher 
the number of investors competing against each other, the lower the probability of finding 
mispriced assets. Fama (1998) states that in the long-run, some market participants might be 
able to profit from the discovery of such mispriced securities, but he also assigns this primarily 
to chance. Moreover, Fama (1998) also claims that even uninformed investors, who built up a 
well-diversified portfolio, generate returns on the same level as institutional investors. 
Nevertheless, securities will not perform similarly and the expected return is mainly a function 
of its’ risk. Prices in general reflect the discounted future cash flows derived from expectations 
built up by analyzing available information. These approaches are rational and follow strict 
rules, whereas the publishing of news is still random and not predictable.    
 The EMH implicates that distinct price adjustments during a false news shock 
emphasize market efficiency. Price changes in individual securities should adjust to such 
overstated news in an independent and unbiased manner. This means that the full impact of 
new information must be incorporated instantaneously (Fama, 1998). More news will arrive 
constantly, but prices are expected to return to pre-event levels as soon as the correction of the 
false news publication is announced. The reasoning for this assumption implies that the 
fundamental value of the asset does not change after a recall of the previously published 
information. 
2.2 Anomalies challenging market efficiency   
 
The existence of anomalies that have occurred over the past decades have caused 
serious doubts about the accuracy of the EMH. Consistent with the results of research in 
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psychology, DeBondt and Thaler (1985) found out that most people overreact to unexpected 
and dramatic news events. This investor overreaction becomes evident when looking at prior 
loser portfolios that outperform prior winner portfolios within thirty-six months after the 
formation. Investors outweigh past performance and disregard the fact that performance tends 
to mean-revert. Counter to the hypothesis of overreaction are Ball and Brown’s (1968) and 
Gilette’s et al. (1999) studies of a so-called post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD). The 
researchers state that returns drift up (down) after announcing positive (negative) news 
regarding the earnings of a firm. This effect is noticeable for a few trading periods and 
continues moving in the same direction for the rest of the year. EMH would suggest, since all 
market participants are well -informed about the opportunity to generate abnormal returns by 
creating portfolios with companies that have announced good earning news (long position) 
respectively bad earning news (short position), they would actively compete to hold these 
portfolios, therefore prices would rise or fall in order to eliminate the returns. Nevertheless, the 
PEAD has survived several robustness checks. Researchers suggest that this anomaly is caused 
by investor underreaction regarding the information content of earning announcements. 
History has shown that earning revisions are most likely to cause significant market reactions 
(Bernard and Thomas, 1989).         
 Of particularly interest for this paper is also the hypothesis of limited attention. Peress 
(2014) states that investors suffer from a so-called “information overload” nowadays. The 
speed of how news are spread today causes a loss in the reliability of information, which results 
in investors ignoring more timely sources. Klibanoff et al. (1998) investigate investor behavior 
towards the coverage of major news events on the New York Times front page. Net Asset 
Values (NAV) are used to provide an accurate measure of closed-end country fund’s 
fundamentals. According to the EMH, the publication in the NY Times should be redundant 
since the NAV already incorporates all existing fundamental information. Nevertheless, the 
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authors discover the contrary, those funds react more to changes in fund’s NAV after the host 
country was well publicized on the NY Times cover page. An explanation for such appearances 
may be found in the limited attention of human beings.     
 Attention is a scarce resource. Hence, investors’ attention is gained towards certain 
securities, which they decide to react on the media-hyped information by trading those stocks. 
Barber and Odean (2008) further show that individual investors are usually attracted to 
attention-grabbing stocks, in contrast to professional investors who are less prone to attention-
driven trades due to more time and access to more resources to monitor stocks continuously 
and follow explicit purchase criteria.        
 According to Fama (1965, 1998) only two types of traders exist. The first category are 
noise traders, who hold random beliefs about future dividends comparing to their counterpart, 
rational arbitrageurs. Due to noise traders, who shift the security price further away from its 
fundamentals, those returns exceed the ones of rational arbitrageurs. Contrary to the EMH, a 
significant divergence from efficient prices exist, but they also demonstrate that the asset price 
is hooked to the fundamental value in the long-run (Delong et al., 1990).  
2.3 The Role of the Media in Capital Markets 
 
When the effects of media on capital markets are studied, it is to mention first that 
Tetlock’s (2007) article tries to prove what empirical experiments already observed, the 
interdependence between the content of media and daily equity market activity. By focusing 
on the influence of Wall Street Journal’s (WSJ) column “Abreast of the Market”, Tetlock 
(2007) investigates whether financial news induce, amplify or simply reflect investor beliefs 
of stock market performance and, therefore, he develops a “pessimism factor”. He repeats his 
test and adds words categorized as “weak” and “negative”. The outcome of his predictability 
regressions stays the same: A modification of the pessimism factor foreshows a statistically 
significant change in returns and trading volume. Further in his studies, Tetlock (2007) devotes 
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himself to the timing of pessimism. He sets up a hypothesis test to answer the question whether 
high pessimism reflects prior investor sentiment or is used as a prediction tool and concludes 
that both theories hold a little bit of truth. Thus, after long periods of low returns, media 
pessimism forecasts low returns in the short-run, but predicts high future returns in the long-
run. Tetlock (2007) explains the occurrence of the latter effect by referring to noise trades, that 
caused a significant change in the stock price. In the long run, prices will be reversed to its 
fundamentals. The next step is to look further into negative investor sentiment and its ability 
to forecast Dow Jones returns. With his regression model Tetlock (2007) shows that the 
pessimism factor has a statistically and economically significant impact on the next day returns 
(p-value < 0.001) and that on average, the impact of a one-standard deviation variation in the 
media pessimism factor causes a movement of 8.1 basis points on the next day Dow Jones 
returns. This temporary negative influence is eliminated by a reversal later in the trading week. 
Assuming that newspapers contain stale information about fundamental values, the market 
reacts consistent with the EMH in the long-run. Secondly, the impact of past Dow Jones returns 
and its ability to predict negative sentiment are investigated. The regression indicates an 
increase in pessimism after negative returns on the prior trading day. A 1% decrease in prior 
Dow Jones returns results in a significant increase in the pessimism factor by 5.8% of one 
standard deviation (p-value < 0.003). Moreover, Tetlock’s (2007) studies provide evidence that 
the pessimism factor influences market activity. The absolute value of pessimism predicts an 
increase in trading volume on the next day (p-value < 0.01 – the results not only hold for the 
pessimism factor, but also for negative and weak words). The phenomena can be explained in 
a way where pessimism acts as a proxy for disagreement between noise traders and rational 
arbitrageurs. This leads to an incline in supply or demand by noise traders, which will be 
absorbed by market makers. Tetlock (2007) concludes that small stocks have the highest level 
of ownership. Consequently, investor sentiment can be used to predict the return of small 
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stocks, which amounts to a larger and longer-lasting impact. He carries out an analogous test 
using the daily Fama – French small-minus big (SMB) factor and notices a longer lasting effect 
of negative sentiment on SMB returns. In other words, the impact of an increase in pessimism 
is still negative after five trading days.      
 Other researchers who investigates the contribution of the media to price formation 
come to similar conclusions. Peress (2014) attempts to prove that, contrary to the EMH, public 
information diffuses gradually and this affects equity prices. In his studies, Peress (2014) 
provides evidence that the media has a significant impact on financial markets, even though 
public information diffuses gradually through investor population. Setting up a causal link from 
the media to capital markets is problematic. It might be the case that both the market and the 
media respond to fundamental new information. In order to be able to assess the causal 
influence of the media, Peress (2014) identifies nationwide newspaper strikes in the print media 
that are not driven by stock market developments and prevent market participants from 
receiving news. His studies reveal that on a strike day the equally weighted share turnover on 
a country’s stock market falls by 12.3% (p-value < 0.005). When market capitalization weights 
are used, this effect is not significant anymore (-1.4%, p-value < 0.681). The contradiction 
between equally-weighted and value-weighted averages leads to the assumption that media 
strikes mainly affect small firms. The author further suggests that individual traders are highly 
responsive to newspaper strikes, unlike professional investors, retail investors do not have 
access to professional news services (e.g. Bloomberg or Reuters) and hence rely on the local 
news coverage of newspapers. Additionally, small stocks are more sensitive to press coverage 
and a usually owned by individual investors. These findings are consistent with Tetlock (2007). 
Peress (2014) also finds that absolute returns behave counter in comparison to turnover, 
dispersion and price range. These variables fall significantly on a strike day, but absolute 
returns do not. From the contrasting behavior of market activity, the author concludes that 
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despite of the strike some informed investors remain in the market and therefore media is not 
essential to the informational efficiency of stock markets, even though it plays an important 
role to multiply information among investors. Additionally, the divergence between return 
dispersion and the absolute value of markets returns indicates that media influences individual 
prices, but not the market. As a result, media attracts less price sensitive investors also called 
noise traders. Supportive evidence is also found by Engelberg and Parsons (2011), who state 
that media is capable of influencing prices.        
 In further studies, Lang and Peress (2009) examine the cross-sectional relation between 
media coverage and stock returns. They find statistically and economically significant return 
premiums on stocks with no media coverage. Those premiums amount to 0.20% (p-value 
<0.005) per month, and stay persistent after controlling for risk factors. In particular, they find 
that for large stocks, which are already covered by many information channels, the role of mass 
media is limited. They further conclude that return differences are even higher for small stocks, 
stocks with low analyst coverage, high unsystematic risk and for those securities that are mainly 
owned by private investors. From their findings, it can be derived that the media effect on 
returns arises from its ability to disseminate information widely and therefore, media coverage 
can be seen as the contribution to a progressive impounding of information into prices.   
3 Methodology  
 
In order to assess the impact of false news shocks on capital markets in the US, an event 
study approach is used to measure the time it takes the market to reverse the impact of the false 
news. Central for this study is the measurement of abnormal stock returns. Given this basic 
premise, a Patell (1976) parametric test is performed and the effect of how a particular event 
changes a firm's prospects by quantifying its impact on the firm's stock price is investigated. 
The initial task is to define the event of interest by screening the online news columns of eight 
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major American financial news providers. When selecting the news providers, it was of 
particular importance that they all cover the newest breaking stories without requiring a 
subscription. No subscription fees allow to assume that individual investors have the same 
access to breaking news as institutional ones. Focusing on a time frame starting on January 1st, 
1999 until December 31st, 2015, the webpages of “Wall Street Journal”, “Financial Times”, 
Bloomberg’s “Business Insider”, “Reuters”, “Forbes”, “Business Week”, “CNN Money” and 
“CNBC” have been searched seeking for words like “fake news”, “false news” and “hoax”. It 
is also important that the affected company gave a clearing statement within the same trading 
day to assure that the fake news can be considered as canceled out within the same trading 
session.            
 The sample is not limited to firms of the S&P 500, which leads to a number of 24 events 
matching the search criteria. In a more detailed prospective, the sample includes 12 technology 
respectively technology-services companies, one airline, four firms related to consumer 
products, two healthcare companies, an energy, a mining, an insurance company and a  
traditional manufacturer. At this stage, it is useful to control for market reaction by 
differentiating between information that is supposed to benefit or harm a firm, here after 
referred as good or bad news. A further sub-grouping by summarizing firm characteristics (e.g. 
market cap, industry, value/growth firm) is needed to allow a more in-depth analysis of the 
effects of a false news shock and to assess for more firm-related stock market reactions. Such 
a step helps to generate evidence for a more general understanding of security price 
determinants and to attribute certain differences in structural and return characteristics to firm 
idiosyncrasies.  Regarding market capitalization, the common definitions for large respectively 
small firms are applied. For the industry classification, it is differed between technology 
industries (SIC 73XX) and non-technology industries. As a last step, each firm in the sample 
is defined as a value or growth firm according to its unique characteristics. This leads to a 
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Figure 1 Overview of sample content 
sample distribution of 12 bad news and 12 good ones. More details about the sample 
distribution are presented in Figure 1. The input data on daily stock information comes from 






   
 
A valuation of the event’s impact requires the measure of the abnormal return (AR). 
The AR is the ex post return of the security minus the normal return over the event window: 
  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑇 −  𝐸{𝑅𝑖,𝑇|𝑋𝑖,𝑇}         (1) 
Where 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇, 𝑅𝑖,𝑇, 𝐸{𝑅𝑖,𝑇|𝑋𝑖,𝑇} are the abnormal, actual and normal return respectively for time 
period t. 𝑋𝑖,𝑇 is the conditional information for the normal return model. In this case, 𝑋𝑖,𝑇 is 
derived from the Fama and French (1993) Multi-factor Model due to variance reduction: 
 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇 =  𝑅𝑖,𝑇 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑇) =  𝑅𝑖,𝑇 − (𝑟𝑓,𝑇 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀(𝑅𝑀,𝑇 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑇) + 𝛽𝑖,𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑇 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑇     (2) 
where 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑇 stands for “small minus big” and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑇 stands for “high minus low”. The 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑇 
factor should capture the excess return from small over big stocks and the 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑇 factor should 
capture the excess return of securities with a high market-to-book ratio over stocks with a low 
one. For the event study the WRDS database event study research application is used. 
Therefore, a normal performance model (2) has to be selected. 270 trading days are selected to 
guarantee a sufficient estimation window. The gap between estimation period and event period 
is set for 20 days to prevent the former from influencing the results of the performance model. 
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The pre-event period is defined as a window of three days prior (t = -3) to the relative event 
date (t = 0). Whereas the post-event window is set for three days post (t = +3) the event. The 
former is used to analyze our results in in the short-run. In order to see long-term effects, 
another event window of a 41-days range around the event date (t = ±20) is set. This relatively 
long time frame is chosen to better analyze the long-term effects of the event. Having set the 
event window larger than one facilitates the use of ARs around the event date in the analysis. 
In order to ascertain the magnitude of ARs over the entire event window, the sample specific 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are calculated: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(𝑇1,𝑇2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1          (3) 
Another measure to calculate the overall return over the event period is the buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR). Given by its definition as the difference between the realized buy-
and-hold return and the normal buy-and-hold return, BHARs allow for compounding and are 
more adapted for long-run event studies: 




𝑡=𝑇1     (4) 
For a further analysis of the sample regarding the post event security behavior in the short 
respectively long-run, the cross-sectional average of each measure is used: 





𝑖=1         (5)





𝑖=1         (6) 
where the averaged CAR is used to interpret results in the short-run (t= ±3) and the averaged 
BHAR to do so for longer periods. As mentioned before, by performing a parametric test it is 
assumed that individual firm’s abnormal returns are cross-sectional independent and normally 
distributed, therefore the test statistic grounds on a classic t-test. The Pattel’s (1976) test of 
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standardized event-window ARs corrects for the test’s prediction error and overcomes its 
proneness to event-induced volatility.   
4 Results  
 
From the news sample, it becomes clear that most of the false and harmful information 
was deliberately produced to impact stock prices. In this sample, only the bankruptcy filing of 
United Airlines and the heart-attack of former Apple CEO Steve Jobs can be considered as 
accidently published false information. Most of the fake news is remarkable often spread via 
social media platforms (e.g. Twitter) or open press release distribution platforms (e.g. 
newswire). It can also be seen that besides news stating wrongly reported firm earnings 
announcement, information about a pretended SEC investigation is commonly used by the 
delinquents. It is also worth mentioning that information about a preference for certain firms 
or industry sectors cannot be provided. For good news, only two types of information seem to 
cause persistent positive effects on the stock prices in our sample. The focus is either on the 
introduction of a new innovative product that seems to derive a significant competitive 
advantage for the firm or a company already agreed on or is still looking to be acquired. 
Accounting for new inventions, those can mostly be attributed to technology firms, whereas 
takeover bids happen to occur equally often in every sampled sector.        
 Figure 2 presents the results of investor behavior on bad respectively good news based 
on daily data, as described by the equations (1) to (6). It can be seen, that after sharp price 
movements that occurred on the event date, stock prices remain at the induced level. This 
pattern applies for both, good and bad news. In the short-run, there are small adjustments 
towards a reverse movement, but drops or jumps back to pre-event levels fail to appear. A mean 
CAR of -4.6% is the result of a -5.6% AR on the adverse event date. The abnormal effects 
pertaining the events of the sample are statistically (t = -6.18) and economically significantly 
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Figure 2 Stock price effects on Good/Bad News - daily data in percent 
different from zero, and thus not the result of pure chance. In the BHARs analysis sharp price 
movements prior to the event can be recognized, but they cannot be attributed to any 
statistically significant events. In this analysis, the mean BHAR on t = 0 equals 5.3%. Although 
it remains positive, it suffers a 5.5% decline. It takes usually between five and six trading days 
until investors start trusting in the fundamentals of badly affected securities again.  In case of 
good news, the mean CAR on the event date amounts of 26.8% (t = 12.19), which can be 
attributed to a 21.1% increase. Counter to bad news, a price reversal in the short-run cannot be 
seen and therefore no immediate price correction. When looking at BHARs, it takes a stock 
between seven and eight days until the event induced return shock reverses to pre-event levels. 
Only when looking at the long-term results, the existence of an upwards movement starting at 
least 10 days prior to the event can be seen, but any significant effects that drive this movement 






In Figure 3 the results towards security movements according to firm size are plotted. 
In this case, it is examined how long it takes stock prices to reverse only taking the news type 
and the company size in consideration. In the short-run and considering bad news, stock prices 
for companies with a small market capitalization drop by 6.9%, which can be considered 
statistically significant (t = -6.81) on the event date. On t = +1 a not economically significant 
correction followed by an almost constant path is noticed. Whereas, the drop for large firms 
turns out to be with 4.4% smaller (t = -2.28). However, in the long-run, it takes small stocks in 
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Figure 3 Stock price effects on Small/Large Firms - daily data in percent 
average six days to closely reverse to pre-event levels. Large stocks recover within the fourth 
trading session. The realized change of BHARs on the event date amounts on average of -7.1% 
for small firms and -5.5% for large caps. Now, focusing on good news leads to different results. 
Firstly, the mean CAR for small firms on t=0 is with 15.86% (t = 5.88) and respectively 8.66% 
for the mean BHAR significantly larger than it is for large firms. It is worth to mention that the 
mean CAR results from an enormous price jump on t=0 (14.9%). Large firms count for a mean 
CAR of 3.6% (t = 5.57), which is the result of an abnormal increase of 5.4% on the event. For 
both firms, small and large, a price correction does not take place in the short-run. For small 
cap stocks the anticipated reversal does not even occur in the sample’s long-run. Only large 
cap stocks recover from the 2% gain within six trading days. Sharp price movements a few 
days before and after the event date cannot contributed to any statistical relevant relationships.  
 




The continued research on the impact of industry affiliation under the influence of news 
is summarized in Figure 4. In respect to technology firms and bad news, the mean CAR on t = 
0 equals to -12.2% after suffering a from a decline of 9.5%. The results can be considered 
statistically different from zero (t = -7.09). Non-technology firms suffer with a decline of 2.5% 
less than their counterparts (t = -1.96) and are able to almost return to pre-event price levels 
within three trading days. For good news, the mean CAR of technology firms increases by 
32.5% (t = 13.08), whereas non-technology firms only experience a rise of 9.8% (t = 6.28). 
When it comes to the stock movement after the event, a familiar pattern can be recognized. 
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Figure 4 Stock price effects on Non-Tech/Tech Firms – daily data in percent 
There is the intention of a short correction, but it straightens out after t = 1. In the long-run, it 
takes badly affected technology (non-technology) stocks in general between six (five) trading 
days to bounce back to pre-event levels.  The results in case of good news slightly differ, in 






In the following section, further investigations on the influence of firm’s value or 
growth definition are conducted. Figure 5 presents graphically the roles news and firm 
definitions play with respect to investor behavior. Looking closer into value stocks affected by 
adverse information, a price drop of 7.1% leads to a mean CAR of -6.3% (t = -2.33) on the 
event date. Growth stocks’ mean CAR suffers a slightly smaller decline of 4.7% (t = -6.1). In 
contrast, favorable news lead to a price increase of 9.8% (t = 5.26) for value stocks and 
respectively to a 32.5% (t = 14.01) rise of growth stocks. Furthermore, the non-existing 
behavior of a stock price correction can be recognized. Prices seem to be almost stable once 
the announcement appeared and the expected rebound does not occur in the short-run. 
Interestingly, when looking at long term periods, it can be seen that value firms do not recover 
from harmful news in our sample period. Prices seem to decline even further, but any statistical 
evidence for such a behavior cannot be found. On the other hand, growth firms recover within 
four trading days. Accounting for good news, value firms also do not recover during our sample 
period, but stay at the shock induced level. Growth firm’s securities, on the other hand, fully 
recover within seven trading days.  
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5 Discussion  
 
 The identified news studied by Klibanoff et al. (1998), Tetlock (2007) and Fang and 
Peress (2009) mainly refer to factors, which at that particular time were still of potential 
importance for the predictability of the future firm profitability. This study is contradictory, as 
it only investigates false news that were responsible for a significant variation of stock prices 
from firm fundamentals. Assuming the existence of fake news and the clarifying 
announcement, the latter should cancel the former out. Therefore, the release of false 
information should not have a direct impact on investor beliefs about the firm fundamental 
values. However, the observed results imply an investor overreaction triggered by certain 
private signals (e.g. reading a newspaper article) that result in an effect on share prices. The 
absence of an immediate reverse might be induced by persistent indirect asset-pricing effects. 
This section presents some indirect effects on false news in order to find explanations for the 
observed results. This study clearly shows what DeBondt and Thaler (1985) already suggested 
in their studies, 31 years ago. The researchers concluded that market participants overreact to 
not expected news events. The presented outcomes not only support their theory, but they also 
show the differences in magnitude depending on more summarized firm characteristics.    
 The results clearly show that false news trigger a shock in the short-run, but the effects 
will not persist over longer periods. This is consistent with DeLong et al. (1990). They prove 
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the effect of public announcements being dependent on perceived reliability and content. 
Firstly, a minimal level of reliability is necessary for the news to be persuasive. Additionally, 
the content should match the investors belief. Hence, new false information can reinforce 
investor perceptions and leads to reactions. This is mainly the case in this study, since all the 
information was published via highly respected and trusted news providers. Regarding the 
second aspect, their theory seems certainly supported by this studies’ outcomes as well. By 
sorting the sample, it can be seen that the effect of overreaction occurs mainly for a positive 
public announcement attracting the fundamentals of a growth stock. This circumstance 
suggests that investors anticipate their beliefs coming true either by the development of the 
long-desired innovation or the acquisition proposal, which underlines that other firms share 
their opinion about the future potential. In comparison, the higher decline, badly affected value 
firms suffer from, may be explained by investors’ recognition of their already low expectations. 
In addition, the results from the industry analysis support the classical research assumptions. 
Technology businesses are also perceived to be riskier and more volatile than their 
counterparts. In fact, such companies face high research and development expenditures and 
uncertain commercialization perspectives of their inventions. This leads investments in 
technology to have a higher risk-return reward. From the sample, it becomes clear that investors 
highly appreciate favorable news, whereas bad news are very unwelcomed at the same time. A 
possible explanation goes along with the one explaining investor behavior towards growth 
stocks. In the appearance of a false company announcement declaring a technological 
breakthrough, investors see their expectations approved and immediately foresee a prosperous 
company’s future without verifying the information. The same happens when the news turn 
out to be bad, investors seem to lose trust in the firm’s market potential.     
 Consistent with this study’s observations is also Peress (2014), who predicts that 
investors suffer from a so-called “information overload” due to the limited attention of human 
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beings. He sees a preference towards trusted media sources rather than official company 
sources. His theory holds true with the findings of this study in which only news providers 
perceived as prestigious and reliable are considered. Nevertheless, in times when such news 
providers tend to post redundant or even false news as soon as they appear on social media 
platforms (e.g. Twitter), as it happened in most of the sample cases, market participants face 
difficulties to verify the information. Furthermore, the speed in which news are presented may 
come at the expense of reliability. It is challenging for individual investors to sort out 
unnecessary information. Whereas, the overestimation of constantly accessible financial 
information intensifies the overconfidence bias. Such traders attribute high values to the 
information they acquire and fade out the potential risks or ignore other signals, which causes 
a delayed price reversal. From Barber and Odean (2008) it is already known that recently 
published news attract a high degree of attention to individual investors that again tend to 
overestimate the feasible quality of short-term information related to long-term results. 
 In addition, in can be seen in the study’s results that ARs for either good or bad news 
are smaller for securities issued by large cap companies. This underlines that on one hand, Fang 
and Peress’s (2009) and Peress (2014) theses of small cap stocks, which are mostly held by 
individual investors, rely on the mass media, whereas smaller return premiums for large cap 
stocks are due to constant broad media coverage and often favored by institutional investors. 
 On the other hand, the small firm effect and the theory of a premium that is required by 
uncertainty-averse investors to hold a risky asset holds true (Fama, 1998, Tetlock, 2007, Fang 
and Peress, 2009). This study’s results show similar effects for the small, growth and 
technology firms in the sample, which by classical research are considered riskier than their 
counterparts. The researchers further state that market participants, when confronted with 
unwelcomed and uncertain news, take the worst-case of the quality of the information. This 
may lead to a deterioration in the quality of information regarding an affected firm and 
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therefore has persistent negative short-term effects on prices for fundamentals.  
 Another possible explanation in case of bad news is provided by Fang and Peress 
(2009). They find in their studies that investors demand higher returns on illiquid assets. 
Assuming harmful affected firms suffer an exogenous liquidity shock, stock prices fall to offset 
investors through higher expected future returns. Building on that, the researchers develop a 
theory of liquidity levels. They differ between a “normal” - and a “low liquidity”- level that is 
characterized by a higher bid-ask spread and a lower price. It might be the case that the news 
event and the subsequent trading halt of some stocks act as an adverse shock to liquidity. Stocks 
move from “normal” to “low-liquidity” temporarily. Hence, the widened spread during the 
sharp price movements and relative high transaction costs prevent liquidity traders from 
trading. Even though the news has been identified as wrong, the lack of active liquidity traders 
has led to a persistent higher bid-ask spread and generates lower liquidity levels. However, 
supportive evidence cannot be found and Fang and Peress’s (2009) implications remain 
unclear.          
 From an arbitrary point of view, theory would expect rational investors to challenge 
noise traders on their over-pessimistic (over-optimistic) expectations, due to the awareness of 
the misevaluation in the short-run (Fama, 1998). Counter to the classical views, arbitrage is 
risky and limited. DeLong et al. (1990) assume that noise trader risk can lead to a mispricing 
that persist in the short-run due to some rational investors’ only interest in the next period’s 
price. Arbitrageurs see themselves confronted to two types of risk:  The uncertainty of 
fundamentals continuing to divert even further and the challenge of timing the elimination of 
the arbitrage opportunity. The results from the event study support the beneficial attribute of 
an irrational investment strategy in the short-run, but also show the occurrence of rational 
behavior over time in most of the cases. The absence of an immediate reversal allows to assume 
investor fear, which can also be attributed to noise trader risk. Delong et al. (1990) assume that 
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traders are well-aware of the false news, but at the same time, they are afraid to be opposed to 
informed sellers. Due to many market participants who react instantly on the just announced 
news without verifying the information, it seems to be rational for investors to sell (buy) stocks 
even though they identified the news as false. Acting on not verified or fractions of information 
leads to persistent drifts, because information diffuses slowly among investors (Peress, 2014). 
 Although this study confirms what recent research predicts, this research approach 
faces certain limitations. New search algorithms can be held responsible for triggering news 
shocks by screening online platforms. With respect to new trading technologies, a more 
efficient analysis can be provided by using intraday data (e.g. 5 min frequency) instead of daily 
data. Furthermore, using a pre-determined research tool, which only allows for basic variable 
adjustments, exacerbates the release of required data. It is difficult to discover cases that have 
similar characteristics as false news shocks. A number of first apparently related cases were 
subsequently shown to result from fraud and ended with firms declaring bankruptcy. The 
relatively sparse occurrence of such events yields to the small sample. Due to difficulties, such 
as the low statistical power or the effect of sample induced biases associated with unique firm 
characteristics, these results can be questioned regarding reliability and unambiguity and 
therefore have to be interpreted carefully.  
6 Conclusion  
 This paper presents views and thoughts about theories and empirics addressing false 
news shocks. Firstly, it is discovered that Fama’s EMH is challenged by various market 
anomalies, which are measurable due to an interdependence of the media and capital markets. 
Behavioral biases lead to investor behavior that cannot be described as rational. Even the 
downward pressure stock prices experience after days with high pessimism in the media is 
studied in this paper. According to Tetlock (2007) it is also possible to create a profitable 
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trading strategy relying on analyzing investor sentiment in newspaper articles. However, it is 
questionable if this strategy will remain beneficial due to transaction costs and taxes, but it still 
demonstrates the influence of the media to harm the idea of efficient markets with the diffusion 
of false information.          
 In the event study, the impact of a false news shock on the stock price of an affected 
firm is measured. The existence of realized AR that are significantly different from zero on the 
event date not only demonstrates that those returns are not the result of pure chance, but also 
supports recent research. This study demonstrates investor overreaction towards unexpected 
news and further strengthens the existence of higher required returns for riskier and more 
volatile stocks.  Furthermore, the shocks have a persistent effect on the stocks’ price level: it 
took securities almost always seven trading days to return to the by our risk model implied 
price levels.           
 Thus, to conclude in relation to the research question, this paper provides evidence on 
the importance of mass media in spreading information among market participants and 
affecting how they perceive news. Stock prices suffer or gain from sharp price movements after 
the publication of false news. Nevertheless, an immediate price correction despite unlimited 
media access fails to appear and therefore further challenges market efficiency. A sustainable 
theory that helps to rationalize the indirect price effects cannot be established. Although 
disrupted liquidity, noise trader risk, perceived reliability and information overload provide 
supportive evidence, but they cannot be made individually accountable for the inefficiency. 
 Furthermore, it is difficult to find similar characterized episodes, which do not involve 
fraud and result in the company declaring bankruptcy. Hence, it would be of particularly 
interest for EMH research to complete this investigation by examining if market participants 
anticipate potential spillover effects for company peers or main suppliers and draw the same 
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